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Non-technical summary
This paper investigates empirically the behavior of government and corporate bonds interest rates, of the LIBOR, and of stock market prices in times of large changes in the fiscal stance. In the last forty years, periods of large fiscal expansions alternated with years of sharp fiscal contractions in all OECD countries. These episodes have been associated with a variety of macroeconomic outcomes and have attracted the interest of macroeconomists since the early nineties. Several papers have studied the response of private consumption, private investment, and GDP growth to substantial changes in the government budget. Instead, the reaction of financial markets around episodes of large fiscal contractions and expansions has been overlooked. The purpose of this paper is to shed more light on the effect of fiscal policy on financial variables.
The methodology follows an empirical approach similar to the one used by Chari and Henry (2002) and by Henry (2000) and (2002) and focuses on changes in interest rates and stock market prices from before to after the periods of large changes in fiscal policy.
The paper begins by investigating the relation between interest rates, stock market data and the stance of fiscal policy by regressing the nominal and the real 10-year government bonds interest rate, the nominal and the real 3-month Treasury bills interest rate, the discount rate, the LIBOR, the corporate bonds' interest rate, the log of the MSCI share price index, and the MSCI share price index growth rate on a set of dummy variables capturing the time distance from the episodes of fiscal contractions or fiscal expansions.
Results suggest that the cost of financing the government debt and the borrowing costs for consumers and firms are sensitive to the stance of fiscal policy. Sharp changes in the government primary balance-to-GDP ratio have the largest and most significant impact on long-term interest rates of government bonds. Interest rates of 10-year government bonds decrease, on average, by 124 basis points around episodes of fiscal consolidations and increase by 162 basis points during periods of loose fiscal policy.
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ECB Working Paper Series No. 390 September 2004 Fiscal consolidations and expansions also affect interest rates of 3-months Treasury bills and interest rates, the LIBOR and an average of the corporate bond interest rate. Stock market prices increase when countries' fiscal position improves and decrease during periods of budget deteriorations. In summary, financial markets seem to welcome fiscal contractions and to punish governments that implement lax fiscal policies. Moreover, the effects seem to be anticipated and to persist over time. 
Introduction
This paper investigates empirically the behavior of government and corporate bonds interest rates, of the LIBOR, and of stock market prices in times of large changes in the Þscal stance. In the last forty years, periods of large Þscal expansions alternated with years of sharp Þscal contractions in all OECD countries.
These episodes have been associated with a variety of macroeconomic outcomes and have attracted the interest of macroeconomists since the early nineties. Several papers have studied the response of private consumption, private investment, and GDP growth to substantial changes in the government budget. Instead, the reaction of
Þnancial markets around episodes of large Þscal contractions and expansions has been overlooked. 1 The purpose of this paper is to shed more light on the effect of Þscal policy on Þnancial variables. In particular, the paper asks several questions: (i) do increases/decreases of the budget deÞcit affect Þnancial markets in opposite way? (ii) do countries' initial levels of government deÞcit and public debt matter for the reaction of Þnancial markets to Þscal shocks? (iii) do Þnancial markets care about which items of the government budget change? (iv) what role do macroeconomic conditions and other economic policies play?
(v) do Þnancial markets react in anticipation of more/less favorable Þscal conditions in the future?
To answer these questions, the paper follows an empirical approach similar to the one used by Chari and Henry (2002) and by Henry (2000) and (2002) There is also evidence that the effects of Þscal consolidations depend on countries' initial Þscal position and on the nature of Þscal contractions. Fiscal adjustments that occur in country-years with high levels of government deÞcit, that are implemented by cutting government spending, and that generate a permanent and substantial decrease in government debt are associated with larger reductions in interest rates and increases in stock market prices. Around periods of Þscal expansions, instead, the interest rates of 10-year government bonds and of corporate bonds increase and stock market prices decrease regardless of countries' initial Þscal conditions.
The contribution of this paper to the existing literature goes beyond documenting the behavior of Þnancial markets around episodes of large changes in the Þscal stance. First, the paper provides more evidence on the impact of Þscal policy shocks on interest rates. For many years, the literature has reached inconclusive evidence. 2 Recently, Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2002), Engen and Hubbard (2004) , and Laubach (2003) Þnd that interest rates of government bonds increase (decrease) in response to expansionary (contractionary)
Þscal shocks in the US. Tavares and Valkanov (2003) believe that a Þscal stabilization permanently reduces the stock of public debt and, hence, avoids a default on government bonds, they can ask for a lower risk premium and interest rates decline. This can lead to an increase of private demand components sensitive to interest rates and to an economic boom.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data and describes the methodology used to identify episodes of Þscal contractions and Þscal expansions. Section 3 investigates the relation between large Þscal contractions and expansions, interest rates and stock market prices and discusses the results.
Section 4 extends the analysis of the benchmark models to account for countries' initial Þscal conditions, characteristics of Þscal consolidations and expansions, macroeconomic conditions, other economic policies, and future Þscal policy conditions. The last section concludes. 
Methodological issues
This section addresses the following issues: the use of yearly data rather than of high frequency data; the choice of studying the behavior of Þnancial variables around episodes of sharp changes in the Þscal stance rather than at the time of the announcements of the policy changes; the strategy used to identify such episodes.
In a rational world with no information asymmetries and credibility problems, are not easy to gather for a panel of sixteen countries over a forty-years period. Moreover, reliable data on
Þscal variables are available only at a yearly frequency for such a large panel. Hence, a feasible alternative is to study the response of Þnancial variables to the occurrence of Þscal contractions and Þscal expansions using yearly data, but including in the sample observations from a few years before to a few years after the occurrence of the large decrease/increase in the government budget.
The advantage of this approach is that one lets the data detect the time of the shock and allows for the possibility that Þnancial markets anticipate the policy change and/or react to changes in the Þscal stance over time as more information becomes available. The drawback is that the connection between sharp changes in the Þscal stance and Þnancial variables becomes weaker the further away from the episodes, due to the existence of other factors in different time periods. As a compromise, this paper concentrates on a window from two years before to two years after the occurrence of a Þscal contraction or expansion. 4 Section 4.6
shows that results are robust to changing the length of the window.
Finally, what is the method used to identify episodes of Þscal contractions and expansions? First, I select episodes on the basis of large changes of the cyclically adjusted primary deÞcit-to-GDP ratio. This leaves aside variations of the Þscal variables induced by business cycle ßuctuations or by changes in interest rates.
Hence, it prevents that the episodes selected result from economic growth or from monetary policy, rather than from discretionary policy choices of Þscal authorities. 5 Second, in the benchmark speciÞcations, I use the same criteria as in Alesina and Perotti (1997) , and Ardagna (2004) . SpeciÞcally, an episode of large Þscal contraction (expansion) is a period in which the cyclically adjusted primary balance improves (worsens) by at least 1.5 per cent of GDP or a period of two consecutive years in which the cyclically adjusted primary balance improves (worsens) by at least 1 per cent of GDP per year, in both years. This deÞnition selects 92 years of 4 In the case of multi-years periods of Þscal contractions or Þscal expansions, the samples include data from two years before the Þrst year of the episode of a Þscal contraction or expansion to two years after the last year of the episode. 5 The cyclical adjustment is based on the method proposed by Blanchard (1993) and follows the application in Alesina and Perotti (1995 Table A2 of the appendix.
Descriptive Þndings
The top left part of Figure 2 shows that the pattern of the 10-year government bonds interest rate around the time of Þscal contractions is opposite to the one around periods of Þscal expansions. From T − 3 to T − 2, interest rates are increasing in both cases. From T − 2 till T + 2, instead, the 10-year government bonds interest rate decreases by 111 basis points in episodes of Þscal contractions and increases by 185 basis points in Þscal expansions. In T + 2, the interest rate is higher in Þscal expansions than in Þscal contractions (8.89%
versus 10.55%) even if in T − 2 the situation was reversed (10% versus 8.70%).
The 3-month Treasury bills interest rate shows a similar pattern. Even though during episodes of Þscal expansions the increase in the rate is not continuous over time, from T − 2 to T + 2 we observe an increase of 188 basis points against a decrease of 86 basis points in Þscal contractions.
Next, Þgure 2 plots the average value of the discount rate. Interestingly, following a sharp increase from T −3 to T −2 in Þscal expansions, the discount rate is almost identical in the two types of episodes. Moreover, its level and dynamics show less clear differences across Þscal episodes than the 10-year government bonds and the 3-month Treasury bills interest rates do.
The last two charts of Figure 2 plot the LIBOR and the average interest rate of corporate bonds. The LIBOR and the corporate bonds interest rate decrease from T − 2 to T + 2 by 167 and 56 basis points respectively during episodes of Þscal contractions and increase by 153 and 185 basis points in Þscal expansions. A more careful look at the charts also reveals that the interest rate of corporate bonds follows more closely the dynamics of the 10-year government bonds interest rates (even though period by period changes are smaller).
The pattern of the LIBOR, instead, reßects more the one of the discount rate, especially in Þscal expansions from T − 1 to T + 1.
Let's now turn to the stock market. Figure 3 shows the average of the MSCI share price index (expressed in US $ and in logs) and its growth rate. While share prices sharply increase as a Þscal adjustment approaches, they plunge in the proximity of a Þscal expansion. For example, from T − 2 to T + 2 the log of the MSCI share price index increases by 6.02 per cent when Þscal policy is tight and decreases by 6.36 per cent when it is lax. The rate of growth of the index is always positive and higher than the one in T − 2 (equal to 4.71%)
during Þscal contractions, but it is negative (except in T + 1) and substantially lower than the 13.39% growth rate in T − 2 during Þscal expansions.
In summary, a Þrst look at the data suggests that the cost of Þnancing the government debt and the borrowing costs for consumers and Þrms are sensitive to the stance of Þscal policy. Financial markets seem to welcome Þscal contractions and to punish governments that implement lax Þscal policies. Moreover, the effects seem to be anticipated and to persist over time. However, by simply looking at the charts, it is not possible to rule out other interpretations.
One alternative story could be that the sharp differences in the pattern of interest rates around Þscal episodes simply reßect differences in the stance of monetary policy if the latter is systematically lax around periods of Þscal adjustments and tight around episodes of Þscal expansions. Looking at the patterns of the 3-month Treasury bills interest rate and of the LIBOR one might be tempted to believe that this story is plausible. However, the dynamics of the discount rate seems to discourage this interpretation. Moreover, the evidence that the 10-year government bonds interest rate and the corporate bonds interest rate continuously decline/increase over time (and do not reßect swings as the short-term rates do) seems to suggest that large changes in Þscal policy can at least affect long-term interest rates. SpeciÞcally, I estimate:
where Financial is one of the variables above, T I M E T − j are four dummy variables equal to 1 when j = −1, 0, 1, 2 respectively and zero otherwise, α i captures country Þxed effects, i indicates the countries in the sample, t the annual observation, and j the episode of Þscal contraction or expansion. For each episode, the samples include observations from two years before to two years after the Þscal contraction or expansion;
. In equation (1), the coefÞcients β 1 , β 2 , β 3 , β 4 measure the change of the left- 7 One would like to measure RI N T 10Y as the difference between the 10-year nominal interest rate and expectations of inßation over the next ten years. Inßation's forecasts over such a long-term time period are not available for the panel of countries used here.
I follow Orr et al. (1995) and compute trend inßation using the Hodrick-Prescott Þlter. I apply the Þlter to each country's inßation rate using quarterly data and a value of λ equal to 1600. I, then, take the average over each year of the trend inßation generated with quarterly data and calculate the 10-year real interest rate at a yearly frequency by subtracting the average of trend inßation to the nominal interest rate. I also start with quarterly data to compute the real 3-month interest rate as the difference between the nominal interest rate of 3-month Treasury bills and the ex-post inßation rate. I, then, average over the year the quarterly data.
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September 2004 heteroskedasticity. 8 Column 1 of Table 1 Lets' now turn to results in columns 5-7. The coefÞcients β 1 , β 2 , β 3 , β 4 are never statistically signiÞcant when equation (1) is estimated for the discount rate (column 5). Moreover, data do not show a clear decreasing or increasing pattern as in the case of interest rates on public debt, especially in the sample of Þscal expansions. of Þscal contractions or in the one of Þscal expansions. This evidence is interesting because it suggests that
Þscal policy shocks inßuence private agents' decisions via Þnancial markets by affecting not only the cost of public debt but also interest rates charged to Þrms and consumers.
Finally, the last two columns of Table 1 investigate the behavior of stock markets. The evidence is consistent with the one for interest rates. The MSCI share price index and its growth rate increase around episodes of Þscal contractions and fall around periods of Þscal expansions. For example, in times of Þscal expansions, the average growth rate of the MSCI share price index is 12.6% at T −2, and it decreases by about 16%, 18%, 10% and 14% in T − 1, T , T + 1 and T + 2. Note, however, that the coefÞcients
are statistically signiÞcant in the speciÞcation for the MSCI share price index only in the sample of Þscal contractions. In Þscal expansions, β 1 , β 2 , β 3 , β 4 are signiÞcant only for the speciÞcation for the growth rate of the share price index.
A reparametrization of the basic speciÞcations
The absolute values of the coefÞcients of the dummy variables T I M E T − j seem to decrease or increase continuously from T −2 to T +2 for the regressions of all Þnancial variables for which we observe statistically signiÞcant coefÞcients. To better capture this evidence, Table 2 estimates a reparametrized version of equation (1):
where F I SC AL is equal to 1 two years before a Þscal contraction or expansion, 2 one year before, 3 at the time of the Þscal contraction or expansion, 4 one year after, and 5 two years after. This speciÞcation has the advantage of being more compact and more convenient when estimating the regressions in the following sections that include more variables on the right-hand side of equation (2). However, it constraints the change of the left-hand side variable to be of the same magnitude from one period to the next. As expected, the coefÞcient of F I SC AL is negative in Þscal contractions and positive (except for the DI SC R regression) in
Þscal expansions when we investigate the reaction of interest rates to changes in the Þscal stance. It is positive in Þscal contractions and negative in Þscal expansions when the share price index or its growth rate are on the left-hand side of (2) (see Table 2 ). 9 Overall, Tables 1 and 2 
Extensions and robustness
Results shown so far are robust to a variety of speciÞcation changes. In what follows, I extend the analysis in section 3 to account for countries' initial Þscal conditions, characteristics of Þscal consolidations and expansions, macroeconomic conditions, other economic policies, and future Þscal policy conditions. I, then, summarize the results of additional robustness checks.
Countries' Þscal position
The response of Þnancial markets to Þscal contractions and expansions can be different in countries with low/high levels of government deÞcit or public debt. In fact, markets can react only when they perceive that the change in Þscal policy affects the likelihood of a default crisis, which, very likely, is correlated with the level of the deÞcit or with the stock of public debt. To investigate this possibility, Tables 3 and 4 include among the right-hand side variables of equation (2) the value of the government deÞcit-to-GDP ratio (DE F) or of the public debt-to-GDP ratio (DE BT ) at time T − 2 alone (Part I), or together with an interaction term between DE F or DE BT and the variable F I SC AL (Part II). 9 See section 4.6 for speciÞcations that also control for time effects.
the coefÞcient of F I SC AL relatively to the estimates in Table 2 in a relevant way for the conclusions of this paper (see Part I of Tables 3 and 4) . 10 Instead, in Part II of Tables 3 and 4 , we Þnd an asymmetry between episodes of Þscal contractions and expansions. SpeciÞcally, in the sample of Þscal contractions (Table 3 Tables 5 and 6 estimate three alternative speciÞcations of equation (2) to investigate whether this is the case.
First, in part I of Tables 5 and 6 , I introduce among the regressors of equation (2), the change of the cyclically adjusted primary expenditure-to-GDP ratio (&P RE X P) or the change of the ratio of cyclically adjusted transfers and government wage payments-to-GDP (&(T R AN SF + CGW )). Second, I deÞne the following dummy variables: (i) E X P L OW 1 equal to 1 if the decrease (increase) of the cyclically adjusted primary expenditure-to-GDP ratio is larger (smaller) than the median change in the sample of Þscal contractions (Þs-cal expansions) and zero otherwise; (ii) E X P H I G H1 equal to 1 − E X P L OW 1; (iii) E X P L OW 2 equal to 1 if the decrease (increase) of the ratio of cyclically adjusted transfers and government wage payments-to-GDP is larger (smaller) than the median change in the sample of Þscal contractions (Þscal expansions) and zero otherwise; (iv) E X P H I G H2 equal to 1 − E X P L OW 2. I introduce among the regressors of equation Table 5 and E X P H I G H1 or E X P H I G H2 in Part II of Table   6 . Third, in Part III of Tables 5 and 6 , I estimate equation (2) Let's begin by discussing the results in Part I and II. First, the qualitative nature of the results shown so far holds. In fact, the coefÞcient of F I SC AL is close to the one in Table 2 . Second, when the estimated coefÞcients are statistically signiÞcant, we observe a positive correlation between changes in government spending and interest rates and a negative correlation between &P R E X P or &(T R AN SF + CGW ) and
Hence, sharper cuts (increases) to primary spending and to transfers and governments'
wage bills are associated with lower (higher) interest rates and higher (lower) stock markets prices in periods of Þscal contractions (expansions). Finally, Part II suggests that Þnancial markets are more concerned about changes in transfers and the governments' wage bills than in the overall primary spending.
Let's now turn to the results in Part III. Consider, for example, results in Table 5 , column 1 for the speciÞcation that includes the dummy variable E X P L OW 2. The 10-year nominal interest rate of government bonds decreases, on average, in each period, by 55 basis points, for a total decrease, from T-2 to T+2, of about 220 basis points if the dummy variable E X P L OW 2 is equal to 1. I N T 10Y , instead, falls only by 19 basis points per period, and by a total of 76 basis points, if transfers and the government wage bill change by less than the median value in the sample. More importantly, while the t-statistics of the coefÞcient of F I SC AL * E X P L OW 2 is equal to -2.54, the one of F I SC AL * E X P H I G H2 is equal to 1.19. This supports the evidence in previous studies that Þscal adjustments implemented by heavily cutting transfers and the government wage bill are associated with economic expansions. In fact, by decreasing interest rates and stimulating the stock market, private consumption and private investment are more likely to increase and compensate for the decrease in aggregate demand due to the fall in public spending.
Finally, around episodes of Þscal expansions (Table 6) , we observe evidence along the same lines when interest rates are on the left-hand side of (2) 
Macroeconomic conditions
This section investigates the role played by macroeconomic conditions. I introduce on the right-hand side of equation (2) the growth rate of real GDP (G ROW T H) and the inßation rate (I N F L) at T −2 and their yearly change to control both for the initial macroeconomic conditions and for the changes in the macroeconomic fundamentals that happen from T − 2 to T + 2. Results are shown in Table 7 . The coefÞcients of F I SC AL are close in size to the values in Table 2 . Moreover, in the sample of Þscal contractions, the coefÞcient of F I SC AL becomes statistically signiÞcant, at the 5% level in the regression for I N T 3M, and at the 10% level in the regression for C O R P, while it was insigniÞcant in Table 2 . However, in the sample of Þscal expansions, the coefÞcient of F I SC AL becomes insigniÞcant in the regressions for R I N T 3M and M SC I , while it was signiÞcant at the 10% level in Table 2 .
The policy mix
An alternative explanation for the decrease (increase) of interest rates and increase (decrease) of stock market prices around episodes of Þscal contractions (expansions) is that governments implement these changes in Results in Table 8 suggest that restrictions on the current and capital accounts lead to higher interest rates and that reforms that liberalize Þnancial markets have the opposite effect. The coefÞcient of the growth of the nominal exchange rate has, instead, opposite sign in the samples of Þscal contractions and Þscal expansions, giving an ambiguous picture on the effect of devaluations/appreciations of the exchange rate. 11 More importantly, the size and the signiÞcance of the coefÞcients of F I SC AL are very close to their values in Table 2 in the sample of Þscal contractions. However, results are weaker when we concentrate on the sample of Þscal expansions. Most likely, this is due to the loss of degree of freedom since the number of observations drops almost by half relatively to the one in Table 2 .
Finally, when I estimate equation (2) 
for I N T 10Y , R I N T 10Y , L I B O R, C O R P, M SC I , M SC I G R
controlling for the initial values of the discount rate or of the 3-month Treasury bills interest rate and for their yearly change, results (not shown and available upon request) are very similar to those in Table 2 . This conÞrms that the evidence shown so far is not due to omitting variables measuring the stance of monetary policy. This result should come at no surprise since the coefÞcient of F I SC AL is never statistically signiÞcant in the discount rate equation and it is often insigniÞcant in the I N T 3M equation. 11 Note that a minus sign of the coefÞcient of E XC H G R indicates a nominal devaluation. 
Do Þnancial markets react in anticipation of improved government debt's sustainability?
Consider a credible Þscal contraction, that is one in which agents believe that the government is able to generate a persistent decrease in public debt. As Alesina et al. (1992) show, in a model with two equilibria, a credible Þscal adjustment can move the economy from a "bad" equilibrium to a "good" one. In the bad equilibrium, public debt is increasing and the default risk is rational since investors demand a risk premium.
Interest rates on government bonds increase making solvency more difÞcult. In the good equilibrium, instead, public debt falls, the risk premium decreases, interest rates are low and investors' conÞdence in governments' ability to honor debt is rational. Hence, a Þscal adjustment that moves the economy from the bad to the good equilibrium can generate a sharp decrease in interest rates. Similarly, a Þscal expansion that is perceived to be long lasting with dramatic effects on the stock of public debt can generate a strong increase in interest rates. Tables 9 and 10 Overall, results support the theoretical prediction by Alesina et al. (1992) in the panel of Þscal contractions (Table 9 ), but evidence is murkier in the panel of Þscal expansions (Table 10 ). Financial markets seem to react in anticipation of the future path of government debt-to-GDP ratio: the higher the decline in public debt after Þscal contractions, the lower the interest rates and the higher the stock market price index and its growth rate. For example, a decline of the public debt-to-GDP ratio by one percentage point is associated
with an additional decrease of the 10-year government bonds interest rate of about 16 basis points (see Table   9 , Part I). Interestingly, when I investigate if the effect of large changes of the government budget on Þnancial variables depends on the decrease of public debt in the future, I Þnd that interest rates decrease and that the stock market reacts positively only when governments are successful in reducing the debt-to-GDP ratio. In fact, in Table 9 are not. However, this evidence is not conÞrmed in the sample of Þscal expansions.
Additional robustness checks
This section summarizes the results of additional robustness checks. Results are not shown and are available upon request. First, I estimate equation (2) controlling for the time dimension. Figure 1 shows that the distribution of Þscal contractions and expansions over time is not uniform. Fiscal expansions are more frequent in the seventies and in the most recent years, while Þscal contractions are more common in the eighties and nineties. Following this evidence, I deÞne Þve dummy variables respectively equal to 1 in 1960-1969, 1970-1979, 1980-1989, 1990-1999, 2000-2002 and zero otherwise. I include them on the right-hand side of (2) . Results show that the size and signiÞcance of the coefÞcient of F I SC AL are not unduly sensitive to this speciÞcation change. In the sample of Þscal contractions, the coefÞcient of F I SC AL in the regression of
R I N T 10Y is not signiÞcant and the one of L I B O R is signiÞcant only at the 10% level. In the sample of
Þscal expansions, instead, results are stronger than the ones in Table 2 . Table 6 , (iv) the policy-mix by including all the variables in Table 7 , (v) the change of the public debt-to-GDP ratio from the last year of the Þscal contraction or Þscal expansion to three years after (&DE BT T +3 ). Despite the sharp decrease in the number of observations and in the degrees of freedom, the coefÞcient of F I SC AL in the sample of Þscal contractions remains negative (positive) and statistically signiÞcant as in Table 2 when I estimate regressions for interest rates (M SC I index and its growth rate). The size of the coefÞcients is also larger than in the benchmark model. In the sample of Þscal expansions, results are once again less strong.
Conclusions
This Notes: INT10Y = nominal interest rate of 10-year government bonds; INT3M = nominal interest rate on 3-month Treasury bills; RINT10Y = real interest rate of 10-year government bonds; RINT3M = real interest rate on 3-month Treasury bills; DISCR = discount rate; LIBOR = LIBOR interest rate; CORP = average corporate bonds interest rate; MSCI = Morgan Stanley MSCI share price index (expressed in US $ and in logs); MSCIGR = Morgan Stanley MSCI share price index (expressed in US $) growth rate; FISCAL = 1 two years before a fiscal contraction or expansion, 2 one year before, 3 at the time of the fiscal contraction or expansion, 4 one year after, and 5 two years after; DEFT-2 = government deficit-to-GDP ratio at time T-2; DEBTT-2 = public debt-to-GDP ratio at time T-2. See section 2.2 for the definition of fiscal contractions and fiscal expansions. Columns 1 -9 estimated by OLS and standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity. T-statistics in parenthesis. See, also notes to Notes: INT10Y = nominal interest rate of 10-year government bonds; INT3M = nominal interest rate on 3-month Treasury bills; RINT10Y = real interest rate of 10-year government bonds; RINT3M = real interest rate on 3-month Treasury bills; DISCR = discount rate; LIBOR = LIBOR interest rate; CORP = average corporate bonds interest rate; MSCI = Morgan Stanley MSCI share price index (expressed in US $ and in logs); MSCIGR = Morgan Stanley MSCI share price index (expressed in US $) growth rate; FISCAL = 1 two years before a fiscal contraction or expansion, 2 one year before, 3 at the time of the fiscal contraction or expansion, 4 one year after, and 5 two years after; ∆PREXP = change of the cyclically adjusted primary expenditure to GDP; ∆(TRANSF+CGW) = change of the ratio of cyclically adjusted transfers and government wage payments to GDP; EXPLOW1 = 1 if the decrease (increase) of the cyclically adjusted primary expenditure to GDP ratio is larger (smaller) than the median change in the sample of fiscal contractions (fiscal expansions) and zero otherwise; EXPHIGH1 = 1-EXPLOW1; EXPLOW2 = 1 if the decrease (increase) of the ratio of cyclically adjusted transfers and government wage payments to GDP is larger (smaller) than the median change in the sample of fiscal contractions (fiscal expansions) and zero otherwise; EXPHIGH2 = 1-EXPLOW2. See section 2.2 for the definition of fiscal contractions and fiscal expansions. Columns 1 -9 estimated by OLS and standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity. T-statistics in parenthesis. Notes: INT10Y = nominal interest rate of 10-year government bonds; INT3M = nominal interest rate on 3-month Treasury bills; RINT10Y = real interest rate of 10-year government bonds; RINT3M = real interest rate on 3-month Treasury bills; DISCR = discount rate; LIBOR = LIBOR interest rate; CORP = average corporate bonds interest rate; MSCI = Morgan Stanley MSCI share price index (expressed in US $ and in logs); MSCIGR = Morgan Stanley MSCI share price index (expressed in US $) growth rate; FISCAL = 1 two years before a fiscal contraction or expansion, 2 one year before, 3 at the time of the fiscal contraction or expansion, 4 one year after, and 5 two years after; ∆DEBTT+2 = change of the public debt-to-GDP ratio from the last year of the fiscal contraction or fiscal expansion to two years after; ∆DEBTT+3 = change of the public debt-to-GDP ratio from the last year of the fiscal contraction or fiscal expansion to three years after; DEBTLOW1 = 1 if, two years after the last year of the fiscal contraction (fiscal expansion), the ratio of public debt-to-GDP has declined (increased) more (less) than 3 percentage points and zero otherwise; DEBTHIGH1 = 1-DEBTLOW1; DEBTLOW2 = 1 if, three years after the last year of the fiscal contraction (fiscal expansion), the ratio of public debt-to-GDP has declined (increased) more (less) than 5 percentage points and zero otherwise; DEBTHIGH2 = Notes: INT10Y = nominal interest rate of 10-year government bonds; INT3M = nominal interest rate on 3-month Treasury bills; RINT10Y = real interest rate of 10-year government bonds; RINT3M = real interest rate on 3-month Treasury bills; DISCR = discount rate; LIBOR = LIBOR interest rate; CORP = average corporate bonds interest rate; MSCI = Morgan Stanley MSCI share price index (expressed in US $ and in logs); MSCIGR = Morgan Stanley MSCI share price index (expressed in US $) growth rate; FISCAL = 1 two years before a fiscal contraction or expansion, 2 one year before, 3 at the time of the fiscal contraction or expansion, 4 one year after, and 5 two years after; ∆DEBTT+2 = change of the public debt-to-GDP ratio from the last year of the fiscal contraction or fiscal expansion to two years after; ∆DEBTT+3 = change of the public debt-to-GDP ratio from the last year of the fiscal contraction or fiscal expansion to three years after; DEBTLOW1 = 1 if, two years after the last year of the fiscal contraction (fiscal expansion), the ratio of public debt-to-GDP has declined (increased) more (less) than 3 percentage points and zero otherwise; DEBTHIGH1 = 1-DEBTLOW1; DEBTLOW2 = 1 if, three years after the last year of the fiscal contraction (fiscal expansion), the ratio of public debt-to-GDP has declined (increased) more ( 
